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Abstract
We present PrivHab, a privacy preserving georouting protocol that improves
multiagent decision-making. PrivHab learns the mobility habits of the nodes of
the network. Then, it uses this information to dynamically select to route an
agent carrying a piece of data to reach its destination. PrivHab makes use of
cryptographic techniques from secure multi-party computation to make the de-
cisions while preserving nodes’ privacy. PrivHab uses a waypoint-based routing
that achieves a high performance and low overhead in rugged terrain areas that
are plenty of physical obstacles. The store-carry-and-forward approach used is
combined with mobile agents that provide intelligence, and it is designed to
operate in areas that lack network infrastructure. We have evaluated PrivHab
under the scope of a realistic podcast distribution application in remote rural
areas, where these programs have to be recorded into a physical format and
distributed to the local radio stations. The usage of PrivHab aims to reduce
this spending of resources. The PrivHab protocol is compared with a set of
well-known delay-tolerant routing algorithms and shown to outperform them.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
In 2003, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO1) implemented a strategic Programme entitled “Bridging the Rural Dig-
ital Divide”. The programme highlighted innovative approaches to knowledge
exchange that were taking advantage of new digital technologies, and that were
based on synergies between information management and communication for
development.
Thenceforth, many initiatives have been implemented in fields as e-health,
e-government, e-education, e-commerce and e-agriculture. The common goal
of these initiatives is to universalize the access to knowledge and information
in order to improve the life conditions of people living in developing countries.
These applications have to overcome barriers like illiteracy, low cultural level of
the population, censorship, etc. E-agriculture services, e.g. Agriwatch [? ], use
all the technologies at their reach: web, email, telephone, SMS, videos, printers,
mail, etc. but even this way, they are constrained by the need of infrastructure
and cannot operate in regions lacking it. It happens that regions where the
communication networks are unavailable or spotty, where these services can not
be implemented, are usually the ones where these e-agriculture services would be
more needed and valuable. Unfortunately, this situation is not likely to change
because the low-population density and low-income level make economically
infeasible or uninteresting to extend the operators’ networks into these regions.
We propose to use PrivHab to reduce the digital divide in developing coun-
tries by distributing podcast radio programs among local radio stations or
other places of interest using Mobile Agent based Delay Tolerant Networking
(MADTN) [? ]. MADTN, as DTN [? ], [? ] uses the store-carry-and-forward
strategy to operate in challenged scenarios where there are no simultaneous
end-to-end paths, but it substitutes DTN’s bundle (just a container of data) by
a Mobile Agent, a software entity that carries the data and makes their own
intelligent decisions.
Our proposal consists in creating a network of handheld devices carried by
persons, and to use mobile agents that will move through this network to trans-
port the data. Thanks to PrivHab, these agents will be able to make their own
routing decisions based on the usual whereabouts of the people carrying the
devices, while preserving their privacy.
Our main contributions are summarized below:
• We present an e-agriculture application, based on a real need, that im-
proves the podcast distribution in rural areas where we cannot rely on
conventional communication networks to distribute them.
1More information can be found on http://www.e-agriculture.org/bridging-rural-digital-
divide-programme-overview
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• We lay the foundations of a multi-agent intelligent system that helps the
decision-making of the agents that carry the messages, while providing the
enough flexibility to let them make their own decisions.
• We define the habitat, the area where a node is more likely to be found,
we explain how to exploit the existence of life-cycles of the network users
to define it and we model it in a simple way to allow operating it under
the scope of an additive homomorphic cryptosystem.
• We define PrivHab, the first geographical routing protocol that uses the
habitat to route the agents based on long-term predictions. To protect
this information and to avoid its disclosure, PrivHab cryptographically
protects it to ensure the habitat become hidden to the other nodes of the
network.
To our knowledge, PrivHab is the first privacy preserving routing protocol
that uses a geographical routing based in long-term predictions. For this reason,
this is also the first work that considers the privacy of a routing information
other than the historic of contacts with the other nodes of the network and that
provides the tools that make this possible.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an
e-agriculture application of podcast distribution that can be enhanced through
the usage of PrivHab. Section 3, summarizes the related work. In Section 4,
we present the architecture of the multiagent system. In Section 5, we present
the habitat, the core concept of PrivHab. In Section 6, we present PrivHab,
a protocol that use the habitats of the nodes to route the messages towards
its destination while preserving the privacy of the nodes of the network. In
Section 7, we expose the results of the experiments made to measure PrivHab’s
performance. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
2. Scenario of application
In this section, we present a practical example of an e-agriculture application
podcast distribution on disconnected areas. This application could be greatly
enhanced by using Mobile Agent based Delay Tolerant Networking, the concept
of habitat and PrivHab.
2.1. Podcast distribution
In some places, due to the region’s dialect preference and the illiteracy ratios,
radio broadcasting is the most important information source for farmers. It
plays a key role in the economy development of the region by disseminating
important agricultural information. This is the main way these farmers can
obtain information as valuable as what are the most appropriate crops for each
season, or the most efficient processing techniques of raw materials, among
others.
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In the Cajamarca region, in Peru´, the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
Practical Action2 records podcast radio programmes targeted to farmers in
Compact Discs and physically distributes them to the local radio stations.
The podcasts contain small how-to explanations, newsletters, information about
prices, etc. This slow distribution method requires the NGO to spend monetary
or personnel resources to bring a copy to every small local station. We aim to
replace this physical distribution by a digital and automated one.
We propose to create a Delay Tolerant Network using a set of small devices
that can be carried by the members of the NGO’s staff or by some local villagers
that collaborate with them. If it is needed, some devices can also be deployed
on strategic locations. We propose to implement an automatic distribution of
podcasts using this network. The deployment’s cost of the nodes should be
low3, and can be considered as an investment, since the NGO will not need to










Figure 1: Map of a scenario of application located in a rural area of Cajamarca (Peru´). White
lines are natural obstacles approximate limits. Podcasts sent from the village of Chota to
Cutervo have to be routed through waypoints W1 and W2 while messages sent from Chota
to Huambos have to be routed through waypoint W3.
Between the NGO and the local radio stations there could be barriers that
nodes carrying the data can not cross, like a cliff, one river without a bridge or
a mine field. Moreover, there could be areas that nodes can only cross slowly,
like a mountain or forest region, or a river with the nearest bridge located a
few kilometres away. Besides, there are some interest locations like markets,
churches, or the NGO’s offices, that are very likely to have a higher density of
nodes. Moreover, there are some zones where nodes can move quickly, due to
the quality of tracks or roads, the existence of bridges or the usage of alternative
means of transport. Therefore, data should try to avoid the problematic areas
and follow paths that take advantage of these interesting zones or locations.
2More information about this programme at http://practicalaction.org/podcasting-3
3Small devices like Raspberry Pi can be acquired by less than 30$/unit.
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This can even imply temporarily moving away the data from its destination.
Figure 1 provides an example: when data from Chota is first routed to the
waypoint W1 instead of directly towards Cutervo, the destination. This is a
constraint that make georouting protocols that assume a plain world without
obstacles, like LAROD [? ], unusable. For these reasons, PrivHab allows the
sender to define a list of locations (called waypoints) where the data has to pass
by in order to reach its destination.
Finally, there are two requirements that can be of great value to the NGO:
1) It has to respect the privacy of its users; and 2) It has to be able to achieve
a good performance occupying a small buffer and using fewer resources. A
cooperator that has received a device from the NGO in order to distribute the
podcasts in an area may not be very concerned about the privacy of its habitat
or the amount of buffer occupied by the podcasts. However, if the NGO wants to
extend the network cheaply by adding other types of nodes, e.g. volunteers that
want to help the NGO by becoming part of the network, it is desirable to reduce
as much as possible the impact on the users’ devices and lifes. Note that lack
of privacy has been identified as one of the main reasons for the unwillingness
of users to participate in DTN [? ].
3. Related work
In this Section, we first explain the reason why we take a reactive approach
instead of a planning one. Then we provide the reader with a review of the re-
lated work. We present the state of the art of Geographical Routing Protocols.
Later, we analyse the different proposals of Privacy Preserving Routing Proto-
cols in Delay Tolerant Networks. Then, we review some Social-based Routing
Protocols that are related, somehow, to our proposal.
Although we realize that the presented problem, distributing podcasts through
an opportunistic network, is similar to those solved by multi-agent planning,
given the characteristics of the scenario (a DTN), a reactive approach may fit
better than a planning approach. As said in [? ], an efficient and fast algorithm
for selecting candidates on-the-fly is required when the mobility of the nodes
produces a changing topology. This is exactly what DTN routing algorithms
do. Besides, due to the absence of simultaneous end-to-end paths and network
infrastructure, it may take long to obtain the habitats of the nodes in order to
plan an itinerary “a priori” because there are nodes that will never establish a
direct communication with the sender. Moreover, given the evolving nature of
the habitats, they may change before the agent’s arrival, making useless most of
the planning effort. Therefore, situations where an agent meet a node with an
unexpected habitat that it is useful to bring the message towards its destination,
can only be exploited if the decisions are made locally, when this information is
still in force.
3.1. Geographical Routing Protocols
Geographical Routing Protocols have been studied both in Ad-hoc Networks
and Delay Tolerant Networks. Most protocols only take into account the posi-
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tion of the nodes at the moment of the transmission, but not their movement
pattern. LAROD [? ] forwards packets to neighbours inside a certain area
located between the forwarder and the destination, without taking into account
the mobility patterns of these nodes. In [? ], a Location Service called LoDIS is
presented to improve LAROD by using gossip-based techniques to update the
location of the destination at each hop. LoDIS improves the performance of the
routing at the cost of the privacy of all nodes, because it periodically broadcasts
their locations and speed vectors. GeoDTN+Nav [? ] is designed for routing
in a network of streets, and it has three forwarding modes. In the DTN mode,
it requires the nodes to know where they are heading. This requirement can
be easily met by certain types of vehicles, like buses or taxis, but it is an im-
portant restriction in scenarios where nodes are carried by people. LSGO [? ]
is a georouting protocol designed to work in Vehicular Networks where nodes
forward messages to a neighbour based on its location and the link’s quality.
LSGO’s main objective is to avoid retransmissions, but its geographic compo-
nent, that takes into account only the actual location of the involved nodes, is
poor. GSPI [? ] is a geographic routing protocol for vehicular networks that
uses greedy mode on straight roads and to use predictive mode at the intersec-
tions, but its predictive mode is short-termed, as it uses the current position
and the speed vector of the nodes. GPRP [? ] improves this approach by
dividing roads into two-dimensional road grids and considering every possible
node movement while predicting. This restricts the position prediction in the
road grid sequence and improves the performance of the network, but makes
this propposal hardly applicable to other kinds of scenarios and difficults its
deployment.
As it can be seen, almost all proposals use contemporaneous information
and short-term predictions, so they fail to take into account long-term trends
of nodes’ mobility. However, in scenarios where the distances to travel are big,
and the density of nodes is low, it is more valuable to know where a node will
go in the next hours than where it is currently headed.
3.2. Privacy Preserving Routing Protocols
Privacy Preserving Routing Protocols are based on the assumption that
nodes are not willing to voluntarily share any information for the good of the
network, and that nodes’ privacy should be preserved in order to stimulate them
to become members of the network. ALAR [? ] allows a source to send a mes-
sage through a DTN without revealing its physical location and proposes an
anti-localization routing protocol. However, the only information that ALAR
protects is the location where the source was when the message was sent. An
anonymous communication solution for DTN has been presented in [? ], but
this one is designed to hide the identity of the nodes, not to protect the private
information that these nodes use to make routing decisions. SPRING [? ] is
a routing protocol designed to vehicular DTN that bases its operation on the
deployment of Roadside Units (RSUs) and on the usage of a group signature
technique called CPPA [? ]. Although its approach is similar to the one of
our proposal, SPRING routes messages using a variation of Epidemic [? ], and
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what it hides is the identity of the source node and its location at the moment
when the message was sent. In [? ], the authors present a generic routing pro-
tocol that preserves the privacy of the routing metric through the usage of the
cryptographic tools derived from the “Yao’s millionaire problem” [? ]. This pro-
posal requires both parts of the transaction to be able to calculate their routing
metric on their own, so it can not be used when the parts need to colaborate
to calculate it. A prediction-based privacy preserving routing algorithm is pre-
sented in [? ]. Hasan et al. provide a way to calculate the maximum probability
of delivery within a community without disclosing node’s private information,
then, messages that have been disseminated through the community in an epi-
demic way are routed to other communities if their maximum probabilities of
delivery are better. This protocol is designed to work in scenarios where the
connectivity, at least inside the communities, is relatively high. SimBet-BF [?
] protect the nodes’ contacts information by blurring them using Bloom Filters
at the beginning of every contact. Then, it uses two metrics, the ego between-
ness centrality and the similarity to make the routing decisions. In [? ] the
privacy is also preserved by obfuscating the social network graph announced to
the neighbours to make routing decisions. Finally, PRISM [? ] routes messages
towards a location while preserving the privacy of the nodes, but does not allow
the source to decide the identity of the message’s destination.
Unfortunately, most Privacy Preserving Routing Protocols aim to protect
the nodes’ contacts information, and their routing usually uses the past contacts
of a node to try to predict probability of a new contact in the future. Other
informations, as the identity or the locations of the nodes may be protected
as well, but to our knowledge, there are no other proposals that preserve more
complex informations used to make georouting decisions.
3.3. Social-based Routing Protocols
There are some Social-based Routing Protocols that are related, somehow, to
the present work. Social-based routing protocols are based on the idea of using
the recent past to model the behaviour of a node to predict how it will behave
in the near future. BUBBLE RAP [? ] classifies nodes using their popularity
inside their community. Then, messages are forwarded to more popular nodes
until they reach the community of the destination. Its design does not consider
hop-distant destinations nor geographic restrictions. So, during the first hops
messages can be moved into the opposite direction of their destination while
they are forwarded to more popular nodes. MobySpace [? ] leverages the life-
cycles of the nodes to track the most visited by every node points of interest.
These life-cycles are modelled this using a multi-dimensional probability vector,
and messages are forwarded to nodes with a vector that it is closer to the one of
the destination. This is a very interesting approach to our concept of habitat,
but lacks adaptability. In MobySpace, the points of interest have to be defined a
priori, and some infrastructure is needed to allow nodes to detect if they are close
to these points. Besides, MobySpace may lead to situations where a node that
spends most of the time at point A, very close to B, is considered a bad choice
because the destination is expected to be on B, without taking into account that
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A is geographically close to B. SANE [? ] uses the same principles but defines
the points of interest in a very broad sense, allowing the usage of more abstract
concepts, and compares nodes using a metric called “cosine similarity”. HiBOp
[? ] extends this approach using any contextual information about nodes to
make routing decisions. One of its drawbacks is the big amount of memory
needed to store information about every other node. Besides, the authors do
not explain how this contextual information can be updated as the behaviours
of the nodes evolve and change, but they recognize that privacy is an important
issue to consider and that more work is needed to solve it. CSI [? ] is a
social-based routing protocol that models the spatio-temporal behaviours of the
nodes using behavioral profiles, and forwards one-to-many messages through the
nodes that are more similar to the destinations. Besides, the authors realize the
importance of the privacy of the nodes and present a privacy-preserving mode
of operation. This way the protocol can operate in scenarios where nodes are
not willing to send its behavioural profiles to other nodes when needed.
To our knowledge, CSI is the only one proposal that takes into account the
privacy of the nodes. Unfortunately, in all other cases, social-based routing
protocols expect nodes to broadcast their information about the locations they
visit or the details about their interests to the neighbours.
4. A Multiagent System
In this section, we first justify the decision of using Mobile Agents to solve a
network problem. Then, we describe the multiagent system needed to execute
PrivHab. Finally, we list and define the different agents and entities involved.
4.1. Usage of Mobile Agents’ Technology
Due to the challenging characteristics of the scenario, to deploy a DTN it
is not enough to achieve a fast and reliable podcast distribution. There are
long distances between the senders and the receivers of the messages, so each
one has to be carried by several nodes to reach its destination. Besides, most
of the nodes near the source are likely to never meet with the nodes near the
destination, making very difficult to obtain information about how to reach
them. MADTN, using Mobile Agents, brings us a set of characteristics that
PrivHab could benefit in order to deal with these challenges.
A Mobile Agent is a software entity that it is autonomous, intelligent, mo-
bile, proactive, and represents a third part. To our consideration, all of these
characteristics are beneficial to PrivHab. Agents need autonomy because they
have to find their way to its destination in a changing and partially unknown en-
vironment; agents also need to be intelligent enough to make decisions that lead
them towards their goal; mobility is capital because agents cannot control nodes’
movement, so they need to migrate when finding a more useful one; proactivity
allows agents to not only react to changes, but also to initiate context-aware
actions (e.g. to start the delivery phase when the agent is near the destination);
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and representativity is the characteristic that allows applications with differ-
ent needs to use the same network in a different way, with the agents making
decisions on their behalf.
4.2. Entities involved
PrivHab’s goal is to improve the routing of the MADTN agents that carry
the messages. The agents involved in this multiagent system are listed and
explained below.
• Habitat agent: This agent calculates and periodically updates the habi-
tat of the node (more details in Section 5). This agent also informs the
Carrier agent of the current location, this way the Carrier agent can track
if the node had approached enough the current waypoint and has to start
considering the next one.
• Interactor agent: Every time a node meets a neighbour, this agent
performs the PrivHab’s exchange of messages to compare the habitats of
the two nodes and decide who is the best choice to carry the message
(more details in Section 6). When the exchange of messages has finished,
this agent informs the Carrier agent of the result obtained, whether the
neighbour is considered a worse or a better choice to carry the data.
• Carrier agent: This agent carries the message, and his goal is to deliver
it to its destination. In order to achieve this, the Carrier agent moves
through the network and makes decisions concerning the best way to reach
a location. It uses the result of PrivHab’s execution, along with other
contextual information, to make a routing decision. The three decisions
that the Carrier agent can made are: a) staying at the current node and
waiting for other neighbours; b) migrating to the neighbour; and c) being
cloned, so one agent remains at the node and the other one migrates to
the neighbour.
Figure 2 depicts the agents and entities that form the system. Apart from
the three agents, there are two more concepts that need to be defined here: 1)
the message contains the data (e.g. the podcast) that a node has sent to a
receiver, it also contains the identifier of both the sender and the receiver, and a
list of locations (waypoints) that the message has to pass by in order to reach its
destination; and 2) the node is a location-aware mobile device (e.g. a Raspberry
Pi or a smartphone), usually carried by a person or placed in a vehicle or in a
certain strategic location.
5. A habitat-based routing
In this section, we present the cornerstone of our novel georouting protocol:
the habitat of a node. We define the concept and show how we model it using
a circle, how it is automatically calculated and the parameters involved in the
calculations. Then, we explain the characteristics of the circular model. Finally,
we provide some examples of automatically calculated habitats.
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Figure 2: Schema of the multiagent system. Dotted lines depict the main interactions between
entities, while slashed lines depict the movement of the agents. The Habitat agent updates the
habitat using information from the GPS receiver. The Interactor agent exchanges PrivHab’s
messages with the other nodes and informs the Carrier agent of the result of the execution.
The Carrier agent carries the message and makes the decision of migrating, staying or being
cloned.
5.1. An approach towards the heatmap
In the described scenario, each node is a small device that may be carried
by a person, placed in any vehicle or located in a static known place. Therefore,
the movements of every node will be strongly related to their carrier. A static
node will obviously remain immobile. A node carried by a person will probably
spend much time in the vicinity of the carrier’s home or workplace. A node
placed in a vehicle will often pass by the same points if it is a regular-itinerary
vehicle like a bus, or it will be inside a particular area if it is a taxi or similar.
In any case, to know the places where a node has been in the past is useful to
infer if a node will visit these places again in the future4.
Figure 3: Heatmap of a node that spends much time in the south of the state of California.
The dark red area corresponds to the area that is usually visited, and the intense yellow spot
corresponds to the region where the node spends most of his time.
4The similarity of the movements patterns of a node to its future movements is above 0.8
for two days, and 0.75 for a week, and remains 0.6 for five weeks [? ].
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To have a heatmap of a node and its neighbours to route an agent would
be ideal. For example, a Carrier agent would want to migrate to a node with
a heatmap like the one shown in Figure 3 if it is carrying a message destined
to the south of California, but would not if the message is destined to Utah or
Wyoming. The heatmap is an extremely accurate, perhaps the most accurate,
habitat (the area where someone is more likely to be found) representation.
However, creating and maintaining this data is a resource consuming task that
does not fit well with the small devices of the presented network.
Therefore, we propose to model each nodes’ habitat using the simplest ge-
ometric shape: the circle. This way, nodes can automatically calculate and
store their habitat consuming the minimum computational resources by using
a mobile average, and they can use it to make routing decisions quickly.
5.2. Definition of the habitat
We model each habitat using a circle. Each habitat H is characterized by two
elements: a centre point and a radius. From now on, we will refer as C = (x, y)
to the centre point of the current habitat, and we will use R to denote their
radius. A habitat is defined by the tuple H = (C,R).
5.3. Calculation of the habitat
The Habitat agent updates the node’s habitat in order to capture the trend
of the node’s mobility pattern. The update process of a habitat consists in
obtaining the location of a node and adding it to his habitat’s model. Nodes use
the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) to update their previous
version of the habitat, named Hold, with a frequency of ω updates/hour. The
Global Positioning System (GPS) can be used to obtain their location, from
now on, we will refer as L = (xs, ys) to the location of a node at the moment
of the update. We assume that every geographic coordinate (a pair latitude -
longitude) can be mapped5 to cartesian coordinates and that this mapping is
known by all the nodes of the network.
Step zero. Initialization of the habitat
At the initialization step, H0 is initialized with the centre point at the same
coordinates of the location L0 (node’s location when the calculation starts) and
R = 0.
First step. Update of the centre
The first step to update a habitat is to update the centre. The centre point
of the current habitat H is calculated by averaging using EWMA the centre
point Cold and the current location L. The only parameter involved is α (more
details about α can be found in Subsection 5.4). This first step is depicted in
Figure 4, where C is calculated averaging Cold and L using EWMA.
5Any cartographic projection can be used.
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C = L ∗ α+ Cold ∗ (1− α) (1)
Figure 4: The new centre point C is calculated averaging the old centre Cold and the new
location L. Note that the centre point C has moved towards L using an α factor.
Second step. Update of the radius
After C has been calculated, the radius R is updated by averaging using
EWMA the radius Rold of the previous habitat and d(L,C), the distance be-
tween L and the centre point C. This second step is depicted in Figure 5.
R = d(L,C) ∗ α+Rold ∗ (1− α) (2)
Figure 5: The old radius Rold is used together with the distance d(L,C) that separates the
new location L and the centre point C to calculate the radius R of the habitat.
As d(L,C) is the radius of a hypothetical circle with centre point C that
contains L. Then, it will be greater than Rold if L is outside the circle with
centre point C and radius Rold and it will be smaller than Rold if L is contained
inside this circle. Therefore, the radius R of the current habitat, which is
calculated using Rold and D, will increase if L is out of H and will decrease if
L is contained by H.
5.4. Characteristics and examples of habitats
A habitat calculated using α = 2Tω+1 models the mobility habits of a node
during the last T hours. The amount of hours T a habitat models is called the
habitat’s time span, it is the span of time modelled by the habitat, and it has
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to be known and shared by all nodes of the network. In a mobile average, each
time a location is used to update the habitat, previous locations lose weight.
Concretely, in EWMA, the last Tω locations weight the 86% of the total, while
previous locations weight the remaining 14%.
Figure 6: Two examples of habitats (dotted circles) calculated with Tω = 12 (α = 0.1538),
black bubbles depict the last 12 locations, sized according to their relative EWMA weights.
Figure 6 shows two examples6 of habitats and the locations used to update
them. The bubbles representing locations are sized according to their relative
weights, so the bigger they are, the more recent they are. Note that the circular
habitat model is not designed to contain all the sampled locations. Its purpose
is to achieve a compromise between containing all, giving more importance to
the last ones, and considering the trend (the more recently sampled locations
are more important than the older ones) of the node’s movements.
6. The PrivHab Protocol
In this section, we first describe the PrivHab routing algorithm and its pre-
vious assumptions. Then, we introduce some important background concepts
that are crucial for PrivHab to protect nodes’ privacy. We explain how to use
homomorphic encryption to solve two geometric problems: point inclusion and
distance between a circle and a point. Following, the details about every mes-
sage that has to be exchanged by the Interactor agents during the execution of
PrivHab are presented. Finally, we provide some discussion about the secure
nature of the protocol and the privacy of the participants.
6.1. Previous assumptions
PrivHab is designed to operate in scenarios where the approximate locations
the message has to pass to reach the destination can be known or guessed
by the sender. They may be known beforehand, may be inferred from the
6The examples have been obtained directly from simulations, and the snapshots have been
post-processed for the sake of the readability and the clarity of the figures.
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knowledge about the terrain, may be discovered via the usage of a distributed
secure position service like [? ], or via the usage of an alternate communication
channel.
This assumption is hard to accomplish in scenarios where the distances and
latencies are small, because the nodes can move through all the scenario and it
is hard to predict where a node will be in the next few moments. However, it is
reasonable in big scale scenarios like the one presented in Section 2 (105Km2),
where the distances to travel and the latencies are big, because the movement of
the nodes will usually be confined in one concrete part of the scenario, with only
few and short occasional trips out of their usual surroundings. If the scenario has
these features, it should be easy for the users to know some things like where are
the bridges to cross a certain river, what mountainous terrain has to be avoided
or what valley leads to the desired location. This is the knowledge needed to
set the waypoints. These waypoints travel together with the message7.
The reader should note that, even if it is impossible for the sender to set the
waypoints, the message can be sent using an approximate destination’s location
as the only waypoint, and PrivHab will try to route the message directly towards
it.
6.2. The routing algorithm
Given the definition of habitat, we assume that nodes spent most of the
time inside the area defined by their habitats. For this reason, when two nodes’
habitats do not enclose the next waypoint W , the node with the closest habitat
is expected to bring the message nearer the waypoint than the other one. On
the same line, when both habitats enclose W , the node with the smallest habitat
is expected to remain closer, and to be more likely to pass by the waypoint.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Three possible situations when comparing two habitats to select the best choice:
(a) The next waypoint is located outside the two habitats; (b) Only one of the habitats
encloses the location of the next waypoint; (c) The two habitats enclose the location of the
next waypoint.
The routing algorithm uses this reasoning to compare two nodes and to
decide who is the best choice to carry the message towards its destination. The
7Note that it is much easier to know the approximate physical path that the message has
to travel to reach its destination, than to know what nodes have to carry it through this path.
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algorithm chooses the nodes whose habitat’s enclose the destination, prioritizing
those nodes whose habitat is the smallest. If a waypoint is contained outside
two habitats, then the algorithm chooses the node whose border is the closest
to the next waypoint. Figure 7 show the different situations that can be faced.
In (a) and (b) node A is chosen as the best option, because the waypoint W
is closer to HA or inside it. In (c) the best choice is B, because both habitats
contain W , but HB is smaller than HA.
6.3. Nodes’ privacy
At [? ? ], the authors recognize that privacy is an important issue in
a routing protocol. In PrivHab, the habitat is used by the Carrier agent to
select the next node of its itinerary, the best node to carry the message towards
its destination. However, it can not be made public, since this will hurt the
privacy of nodes. For this reason, nodes need PrivHab to be secure and do
not reveal information about their habitats. On the other hand, waypoints are
routing information that has to be known by the nodes that take custody of
the message. Moreover, although they are not a private information, they must
remain hidden to the nodes that do not need this information. Besides, the
presented protocol is fully compatible8 with pseudonym generator mechanisms
as [? ] that generate pseudonyms of the nodes using its public key, or [?
] that uses a secret shared between the nodes and hashing functions. These
mechanisms can be used in scenarios where the destination does not want the
forwarders of the messages to associate its identity with a set of waypoints.
PrivHab uses techniques of secure multi-party computations to protect nodes’
privacy. This way, the habitats and the waypoints are operated and compared
while cryptographically protected in order to avoid revealing this private infor-
mation to the other parts.
6.4. Background: homomorphic encryption
PrivHab requires the cryptosystem used to have a concrete property: to
be additive homomorphic. An additive homomorphic cryptosystem is one in
which, given two encrypted operands E(a) and E(b), E(a+ b) can be computed
without separately decrypting each one.
The cryptosystem used by PrivHab is the Paillier [? ]. In a communi-
cation between Alice and Bob, Alice selects two random primes p and q and
computes n = pq; plaintext messages are elements of Zn; however, ciphertext
messages are elements of Zn2 . Then Alice picks a random g ∈ Z∗n2 such that
gcd((L(gλ mod n2)), n) = 1, where λ = lcm(p−1, q−1) and L(x) = (x−1)/n.
Alice’s public key9 is PkA : (n, g) and her private key is pkA : (λ, p, q).
8A tuple with three values greater or equal than 0, sent in the third step of the protocol,
does not reveals if the data has to be sent to B because it is a better carrier than A or because
B is the destination.
9If Bob does not trust Alice when she generates her Paillier modulus, he can ask she to
prove it is the product of exactly two nearly equal primes [? ].
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To encrypt a message m, Bob picks a random r ∈ Z∗n and computes c =
E(m) = gm · rn mod n2, the ciphertext of m. Then, Bob can easily compute
E(a+ b) = E(a) ·E(b) mod n2 = ga+b · (r1 · r2)n mod n2) and E(a · s) = E(a)s
mod n2 = ga·s · (rs1)n mod n2).
Finally, to decrypt a ciphertext c, Alice computes D(c) = L(cλ mod n2) =
m.
6.5. Background: point inclusion
A point P : (xP , yP ) is contained inside a circular habitat with centre C :
(xC , yC) and radius R if and only if the distance
√
(xC − xP )2 + (yC − yP )2
between C and P is lesser than R. Equivalently, we can check the sign of
d = R2 − ((xC − xP )2 + (yC − yP )2), P is contained inside the circle if d > 0.
This way PrivHab can know if a waypoint is contained inside the habitat using
only operations allowed by the Paillier cryptosystem.
6.6. Background: distance between a circle and a point
The distance between a point P : (xP , yP ) and a habitat H with cen-
tre C : (xC , yC) and radius R is d(H,P ) =
√
(xC − xP )2 + (yC − yP )2 − R.
Equivalently, we can compute X : (a, b), the nearest point of H to P , with
a = xC − R · cosβ and b = yC − R · sinβ being β = tan−1( yC−yPxC−xP ) the an-
gle between the x axle and the segment joining P and C. Then, we calculate
d(H,P ) = d(X,P ) =
√
(a− xP )2 + (b− yP )2. This way PrivHab can compare
one node’s distance with another’s using only operations allowed by the Paillier
cryptosystem10: by checking the sign of d = d1(X1, P1)
2 − d2(X2, P2)2.
6.7. Background: mapping negatives
In order to calculate both the point inclusion and the distance between a
circle and a point, PrivHab requires subtraction between encrypted values. To
allow us to work with Paillier operations over encrypted data, we substitute
the subtraction by the addition of a negative value. However, as there are no
negative values in Zn, we map them in a way that they could still be added to
other cyphered operands or multiplied by a plain operand.
We map positive integers lower than n/2 using the identity function and




x x ∈ [0, n/2)
x+ n x ∈ (−n/2, 0) (3)
This way, we use Paillier addition between a positive integer a and a negative
integer −b (mapped as −b+ n) to obtain (a− b) + n mod n. Note that if a > b
10Note that d(H,P )2 = (
√
(xC − xP )2 + (yC − yP )2 − R)2 cannot be computed without
computing first the square root. While d(X,P )2 = (a − xP )2 + (b − yP )2 can be computed
without computing any square root.
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then (a − b) + n mod n = (a − b), and that if a < b then (a − b) + n mod n =
(a − b) + n. The same way, we can use the Paillier multiplication between
a negative integer −b (mapped as −b + n) and a plain operand s to obtain
(−b + n) · s mod n = −b · s + n · s mod n = −b · s + n. Then, the result of




x x ∈ [0, n/2)
x− n x ∈ (n/2, n− 1] (4)
In order to use this mapping, we have have to ensure that the operations used
in our system never exceed the boundary of n/2, which means that encrypted
computation results should never be a positive integer higher than n/2 nor a
negative number lower than −n/2. For this reason, since PrivHab works with
32 bit GPS precision coordinates11, the minimum key length (n value) allowed
in PrivHab is 128 bits, since 32 bits are for positive integers, other 32 bits are
for the results of multiplications between positive integers, 32 bits more allow
the results of multiplications of a negative and a positive integer, and 32 bits
more are accounted for negative integers. Finally, Figure 8 provides a scheme
of this mapping.
Figure 8: Positive integers are mapped to Zn using the identity function. Negative integers are
mapped to the higher part of Zn using its representation modulo n. Positives and negatives
are separated in Zn by n/2.
6.8. Exchanged messages
We assume that every location can be mapped to two-dimensional coordi-
nates with a mapping known to both A, the node that carries the data, and B,
a candidate neighbour. Let A’s habitat be HA : (CA, RA). Let W [i] : (xW [i],
yW [i]) be the next waypoint where the data has to be carried to. Let B’s habi-
tat be HB : (CB , RB). We denote EY (m) as the Paillier additive homomorphic
encryption of m using Y ’s public key. We denote a message sent by A to B with
A→ B : message.
The PrivHab protocol, described below, requires the Interactor agents of the
two nodes to exchange three messages.
11Note that latitude-longitude pairs have first to be converted into (x, y) coordinates using
any cartographic projection, then these coordinates have to be converted into integers to
operate with them. Finally, if needed, the resulting distances or radius must be mapped into
negatives to allow subtractions.
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1. Node A calculates dA = d(HA,W [i])
2, the square of the distance between
its habitat and W [i]; dA = 0 if W [i] ∈ HA and dA ≥ 1 otherwise. A
knows both HA and W [i], so the calculation of dA is very easy and can
be performed quickly, without using homomorphic encryption.
2. Node B announces12 to A the centre CB : (xCB , yCB ) of its habitat.
B → A: EB(xCB ), EB(yCB )
3. Node A, using Equations 5 and 6, subtracts the coordinates of W [i] to the
coordinates of C. Then, A multiplies both results by the same nonce (a
random one-use value).
EB((xCB + (−xW [i])) · nonce) = (EB(xCB ) · EB(−xW [i]))nonce (5)
EB((yCB + (−yW [i])) · nonce) = (EB(yCB ) · EB(−yW [i]))nonce (6)
Following, A sends to B the results and the coordinates of W [i], the dis-
tance dA and the radius RA.
A→ B:
EB((xCB + (−xW [i])) · nonce), EA(−x2W [i]),
EB((yCB + (−yW [i])) · nonce), EA(−y2W [i]),
EA(−RA), EA(−dA), EA(−2xW [i]), EA(−2yW [i]),
EA(−xW [i]), EA(−yW [i])
4. B decrypts the received subtractions and uses the decrypted values to
compute β using equation 7.
β = tan−1
(
(yCB + (−yW [i])) · nonce
(xCB + (−xW [i])) · nonce
)
(7)
Node B uses β to calculate X, the nearest point of HB to W [i], X : (a =
xCB −RB · cosβ, b = yCB −RB · sinβ). Then, B calculates the square of
the distance d(HB ,W [i])
2 = d(X,W [i])2 = dB using Equation 8.
EA(dB) = EA((a− xW [i])2 + (b− yW [i])2) =
EA(a
2 − 2axW [i] − x2W [i] + b2 − 2byW [i] − y2W [i]) =
EA(a
2) ·EA(−2xW [i])a ·EA(−x2W [i]) ·EA(b2) ·EA(−2yW [i])b ·EA(−y2W [i]) =
(8)
Following, B calculates the point inclusion of W [i] in HB using Equation
9, the comparison of distances using Equation 10, and the comparison
of radius using Equation 11. This time, three different nonce values are
12This announcement can be made by adding this information to the messages exchanged
during the neighbour discovery process.
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used to randomize the results. The dA factor is used to blur
13 the point
inclusion test and the comparison of radius.
EA((R
2
B+dB+(−dA)) ·nonce) = (EA(R2B) ·EA(dB) ·EA(−dA))nonce (9)
EA((dB + (−dA)) · nonce) = (EA(dB) · EA(−dA))nonce (10)
EA((RB + (−dA ·RB) + (−RA)) · nonce) =
(EA(RB) · EA(−dA)RB · EA(−RA))nonce (11)
Finally, B orders the results of the two comparisons and the point inclusion
test in a random way and sends it to A.
B → A:
EA((RB + (−dA ·RB)−RA) · nonce),
EA((R
2
B + dB + (−dA)) · nonce),
EA((dB + (−dA)) · nonce) randomly ordered.
5. Node A decrypts the three received values. B is considered a better choice
if and only if the three decrypted values are negative or 0.
Figure 9 depicts the exchange of messages.
6.9. Security evaluation
In secure multi-party computations [? ], a protocol is considered secure if it
reveals only the result of the function and the inferences that can be deduced
from this output with one or more input values. The presented protocol has
been designed following these principles. On one hand, node A only knows if
HB is better or worse than HA. Then, A can use this knowledge to infer about
the relation between dA and dB , the relation between RA and RB , or to deduce
if W [i] ∈ HB . On the other hand, node B cannot even know the result of the
execution, so it cannot learn anything about HA. Maintaining W [i] hidden to
B (only β is revealed) when the data is not forwarded is crucial to avoid that
B can calculate dB and use it to infer information about HA.
Anything learned by A about HB is also learnable from the result alone.
Moreover, when the Carrier agent migrates to B the waypoints are revealed to
it, because waypoints will be needed in next steps of the routing. Otherwise, the
only thing B learns about W [i] is the angle14 β where it is located in relation
with HB .
13If dA > dB , then the best choice is B, and the result of the point inclusion test and the
comparison of radius are not needed.
14The angle β is a less accurate information than the coordinates of W [i] or the distance
between W [i] and HB . Moreover, B does not even know who is the destination, and the
protocol will not be executed again between the same participants. Therefore, B can not
relate W [i] with any node neither triangulate its location.
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A B
Figure 9: Sequence of the messages exchanged by the Interactor agents during the execution
of PrivHab.
On the other hand, an active attacker can try to learn things about the
other part’s habitat by producing chosen-destination arbitrary messages and
repeatedly executing PrivHab. In any case, the information obtained by the
attacker is the same information that he can infer from a truthful execution of
the protocol. As A is the node that starts the transaction and the only one that
knows the number of messages he carries, he can determine how many times to
execute PrivHab+. If A executes PrivHab enough times, he can try to uncover
the area covered by HB . Given that nodes always operate with encrypted data,
there is no way for one part to tell apart a truthful execution of PrivHab from
an untruthful one. However, B can decrease the effectiveness of these attacks
by limiting the amount of interactions per unit of time with every other node
and forcing A to send him at once the information needed to perform all the
executions before sending any response. Besides, the information protected by
PrivHab, the habitat, changes periodically. For this reason, slowing enough an
attack is equivalent to avoiding it, because when time passes the habitats change
and the first things learned by the attacker become obsolete.
7. Experiments and Results
In this section, we study the computational and communication overhead
introduced by PrivHab. Then, we explain the scenario we have chosen to eval-
uate PrivHab’s and other well known DTN routing protocols, and how we have
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modelled and simulated it. Finally, we provide the obtained results, and we
compare PrivHab with a set of popular DTN routing algorithms.
7.1. Physical implementation
As a proof-of-concept we have deployed an implementation of the presented
protocol on three Raspberry Pi boards15. These are very cheap low-end devices
that fit very well with the characteristics of the proposed application, and they
are ideals to deploy a prototype network that will allow us to run field exper-
iments in the near future. We have used them to measure the overhead that
PrivHab adds to every transaction.
We have used our proof-of-concept implementation, using Paillier’s length
keys of 512, 1024 and 2048 bits, to forward 600 podcasts of sizes between 10MB
and 20MB16. We have repeated the tests twenty times. We have measured the
average time needed by the Interactor agent to make the calculations and to
exchange all the messages. The obtained results are shown in Table 1 and have
been incorporated to the simulations.
As can be seen in Table 1, PrivHab execution time depends heavily on the
key length used. When using keys of 512 bits, PrivHab can be executed by a
low-end device in less than half a second. Meaning an overhead of less than 3%
when sending messages larger than 10MB. The execution time increases to 2.5
seconds when using keys of 1024 bits. Given the average length of connectivity
windows in remote village scenarios presented in [? ], this overhead is acceptable.
When using keys of 2048 bits, the execution time is high. The key length should
be chosen keeping in mind the duration of the connectivity windows and the
security requirements of the scenario. In the presented application, the overhead
of 2.5s using a 1024 bits key is efficient and secure enough17.
Key Time Overhead Overhead
length (ms) 10MB (%) 20MB (%)
512 bits 401.94± 0.5 2.44 1.22
1024 bits 2, 585.05± 23.1 15.69 7.84
2048 bits 15, 018.9± 38.8 91.13 45.57
Table 1: Average execution time of PrivHab using different key lengths. The overhead is the
extra amount of time needed to send a message of 10MB or 20MB.
15Raspberry Pi Broadcom BCM2835 SoC full HD, 700MHz Low Power ARM1176JZ-
F, 512MB SDRAM, 256MB SD with Raspbian, Wi-Pi Wireless Adapter (802.11n up to
150Mbps), GPS receiver NL-302U (baud rate: 4800 bauds) and a dual output 5000mAh
battery.
16This is the size of an audio file with ID3 version 2.4.0, extended header, containing: MPEG
ADTS, layer III, v1, 128 kbps, 44.1 kHz, stereo, with a duration between 10 and 20 minutes.
17The effort needed to break the provided security is equivalent to the effort needed to
factor a 1024 bits RSA key.
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7.2. Modelling and simulations
The scenario we have used in all the simulations is the one presented in
Section 2. Nodes implement a mobility pattern that takes into account their
hotspots [? ] (home’s and work’s location). Agents carrying podcasts are
injected in the network by the NGO office, who knows the exact location and
the necessary waypoints to reach every destination. Nodes use PrivHab to
make routing decisions. Carrier agents always chose to migrate to nodes that
are considered better choices by the PrivHab algorithm. Table 2 provides the
simulation parameters that have been used.
Parameter Value
Total nodes 95
Source nodes 1 static
Destination nodes 2 static
Other nodes 92 mobile
Message size 10− 20 MB
Buffer size 200 MB
Scenario size 15x7 Km
Simulated time 2.5 weeks
PrivHab’s overhead 2.5 seconds






Table 2: Parameters used at the simulations.
We have compared the performance of PrivHab with a bench-mark of well-
known DTN routing protocols used in [? ]: Prophet [? ], Binary Spray &
Wait (L=40) [? ], Epidemic [? ] and Random [? ]. We have added two
routing protocols to this set: MaxProp [? ] and First Contact18. Random
and First Contact are traditionally considered to achieve the lower bound of
single-copy routing performance. Prophet and MaxProp are representatives in
contacts-based prediction routing algorithms, the most common type of routing
in privacy preserving protocols. Finally, BS&W and Epidemic are representa-
tives of flooding-based algorithms. All simulations have been performed using
The Opportunistic Network Simulator (The ONE) [? ], and have been repeated
twenty times using different random seeds.
The performance of all the compared protocols in terms of delivery ratio
and latency while using different message generation ratios is depicted in Figure
10. Flooding-based protocols, as Epidemic and Prophet, fill the buffers early
and perform badly with a high or medium message generation ratio. Therefore,
18When a neighbour is met, each podcast that has not been carried previously by the new








































































































































































(c) Latency and delivery ratio obtained using a message generation ratio of: 0.125− 0.25 messages/hour.
Figure 10: Performance’s comparative using different message generation ratio. MaxProp
equals PrivHab’s performance with a medium ratio, and outperforms it with a low one.
PrivHab also benefits from a lower ratio to increase the amount of messages it delivers.
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they obtain high latencies and low delivery ratios because nodes are forced to
drop podcasts. When the message generation ratio is low, their latencies im-
prove, but as most of the opportunistic contacts end before nodes had been
able to forward all the carried messages, their delivery ratio continues to be
low because podcasts lose opportunities to advance through their destination.
MaxProp performs better because of his dropping policy based on probabili-
ties of delivery, and improves vastly as the message generation ratio decreases.
This way, MaxProp performs badly in terms of latency with a high message
generation ratio, but achieves a good performance with a medium one, and out-
performs the other protocols with the low one. Binary Spray & Wait performs
well both in terms of latency and delivery ratio in all cases, but does not im-
proves much its perfomance when the message generation ratio changes because
of his depth-style spread. Therefore, it is a good choice (it obtains the lowest
latency) with a high message generation ratio, but a bad one with a medium
or low ratio. Besides, even in its best case scenario, its delivery ratio is not
as good as PrivHab’s because in BS&W the spread is not directed towards the
destination. Finally, First Contact, Random and specially PrivHab obtain a
high delivery ratio in all cases because they do not face the problems related to
the size of the buffers and the connectivity windows. However, the performance
of these protocols in terms of latency depends on the quality of their decision-
making protocol. Random is the worst because it is equally likely to make a bad
or a good choice. First Contact performs better because it forces podcasts to
move away from their origin. These two protocols become worse by comparison
as the message generation ratio decreases and the flooding protocols improve
their results. Finally, PrivHab, that takes the best decisions because it takes
into account both the pathway to the destination and the mobility patterns of
the neighbours, obtains the best performance with a high message generation
ratio, and perfroms slightly better, or worse, than MaxProp with a medium and
low one.
Protocol Dropped messages Network overhead (%)
Message generation High Low High Low
Epidemic 1, 041, 105.3 742, 610.4 86, 636.4 6, 157.2
Prophet 628, 897.4 329, 756.3 89, 705.5 35, 357.7
Maxprop 206, 372.7 8, 145.9 7, 682.2 162.1
BS&W 2, 105.1 4, 645.0 86.8 64.6
Random 86.9 7, 3 40, 582.5 2, 557.6
First Contact 75.8 5.2 137.9 85.5
PrivHab 75.5 19.1 20.3 12.7
Table 3: Obtained results in terms of network overhead and number of dropped messages.
PrivHab and First Contact waste fewer network resources.
Table 3 shows the average number of dropped messages and the network
overhead, calculated as the relation between the number of the relays done and
the number of delivered podcasts. Both low and high message generation ratio
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cases have been considered. Low network overhead is desirable because reducing
relays saves battery and increases the amount of time nodes are operational.
Epidemic, Prophet, MaxProp and Random generate an enormous overhead of
several thousand percent when the message generation ratio is high. This means
that almost all nodes effort while forwarding podcasts is wasted, either because
the podcasts are dropped or because the majority of the relays are bad choices.
However, MaxProp improves its results and obtains a lower network overhead
when the message generation ratio is low. This means that MaxProp generates
copies that fill the buffers and consume energy because multiplies the number
of relays done, but it makes use of this effort to deliver the podcasts to their
destination. BS&W has a small amount of dropped podcasts, in comparison
with the other multi-copy protocols, and a low network overhead. BS&W tries
to limit the amount of resources used and obtains the second lowest network
overhead with a low message generation ratio, but its perfomance in terms of
latency and delivery ratio is not as good as others’. First Contact and PrivHab
have generated a small amount of dropped messages, but the lowest network
overhead of PrivHab means that his routing decisions are much better. The
small network overhead produced by PrivHab could even allow users to use the
same devices to run other applications because the main application does not
congests either the device or the network.
Following, Table 4 finishes the comparison, regarding the Cajamarca sce-
nario. In addition to those metrics that had been studied in previous paragraphs,
delivery ratio, latency and network overhead; we also take into consideration the






PrivHab Geographic Preserved Constant
MaxProp Contacts-based Violated Linear
Prophet Contacts-based Violated Linear
BS&W Flooding Not considered Constant
Epidemic Flooding Not considered Constant
First
One-copy Not considered Constant
Contact
Random One-copy Not considered Constant
Table 4: Feature comparison of the protocols. Contacts-based routing algorithm tend to
violate nodes privacy and to have at least a linear complexity.
Nodes’ privacy is preserved by PrivHab, which is the only one that uses
private information in a secure manner. Privacy is obviously not considered
by the protocols that do not use node-related information to make choices,
but it is heavily violated by Prophet and MaxProp while nodes exchange their
likelihood to contact others. However, their privacy preserving counterparts do
not have this limitation, but they route the messages similarly, using a contacts-
based prediction, so they perform similarly in this scenario. PrivHab, BS&W,
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Epidemic, First Contact and Random need a constant number of operations
to make a routing decision. Contacts-based algorithms need to update and
compare an amount of probabilities that grow linear with the number of nodes
of the network. When operating in networks with lots of nodes, probabilistic
protocols have to limit the amount of encounter probabilities they store. This
limitation decreases their performance because this reduces the value of their
heuristics.
PrivHab delivers more messages to its destination. Besides, it does it faster
than all other protocols except MaxProp with a low message generatio ratio,
and it consumes fewer network resources to do so. Moreover, it preserves nodes’
privacy and performs well in scenarios where the number of nodes is high and
the destinations of the messages are hop-distant. Taking into account all these
aspects, we can state that PrivHab is the protocol that suits better to any
scenario with characteristics like the presented one.
8. Conclusions
The habitat models node’s whereabouts during the habitat’s time span. It
is useful to compare nodes to decide who is a better choice to carry the data
towards its destination. In this paper, we present PrivHab, a privacy preserving
multiagent geographical routing protocol based on MADTN that uses the habi-
tats to make decisions. PrivHab also makes use of homomorphic cryptography
techniques to preserve nodes’ privacy. We have presented a podcasts distri-
bution application in rural areas lacking communication networks that could
benefit from the characteristics and the performance of PrivHab.
PrivHab’s characteristics make him ideal to operate not only in this concrete
scenario of application, but also in any other DTN scenario with similar char-
acteristics: scenarios where nodes mobility patterns are complex, but routinary,
where lots of hops are needed to reach the destination of the messages from
their source, and where nodes are so related, directly or indirectly, to a person
that their privacy needs to be protected.
As future lines of research, we plan to study different behaviours for the
Carrier agent, to improve the circular model of habitat using a more complex
representation, and to develop an enhanced version of PrivHab that compares
simultaneously three or more habitats. We also plan to study the performance
of PrivHab in different scenarios based on real applications that could benefit
from a geographic routing approach.
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